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Introduction
How do political parties position themselves on new issues arising on the political agenda?
Parties have durable ideologies that constrain the way they come to terms with new challenges (Marks and Wilson 2000) and established constituencies with long-standing agendas that reflect intense commitments on the part of leaders and activists. The response of a political party to a new issue is conditioned by the ideologies of party leaders and the reputational constraints imposed by prior policy positions. Parties assimilate and exploit new issues within existing ideologies, which in Western European party systems are summarized by the social cleavages that give rise to party families (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) . We demonstrate the strength of these ideological commitments as predictors of party positions on the emerging issue of European integration.
We evaluate the explanatory power of the cleavage theory against three plausible alternative hypotheses. First, the positions taken by political parties on a new issue depend on the national context.
If national states, cultures, societies, or economies are sufficiently distinctive, so variation among individual parties may have a strong cross-national component. This explanation expresses the conventional wisdom among students of international relations who have long conceptualized European integration as the product of bargaining among governments representing the national interests of each member state (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1998, ch.1) . From this standpoint, the most important determinant of a political party's position on European integration is its national location, not its ideological cast or electoral strategy.
A second alternative to cleavage theory explains party positioning as a response to voters' issue positions. To the extent parties strategize for votes, one expects them to respond to distribution of opinion among voters (Iversen 1994, 157) . The way they do so depends upon the assumptions one makes about voting behavior. To test this alternative explanation we elaborate a hypothesis that is consistent with standard spatial theories of voting and yields point predictions in multi-party systems.
A third set of hypotheses depends on the notion that political parties strategize about dimensions of party competition in adopting positions on new issues. Mainstream parties attempt to protect the status quo by suppressing the salience of a new issue that cuts across existing dimensions of party competition, while small or excluded parties have an incentive to take an extreme position on such issues in an effort to raise their salience and refocus party competition (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989) .
This article addresses party positions on the issue of European integration in the period 1984 to 1996, during which the European Union developed rapidly as an integrated economy and a multi-level polity (Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996; Scharpf 1999, conclusion; Hooghe and Marks, 1999; Pollack 2000; Wallace and Wallace 2000, ch.1) . The Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) created the basis for economic and monetary union within a supranational polity that explicitly weakened national sovereignty. Consequently European integration became increasingly salient for national political parties and mass publics.
Drawing on data from Eurobarometer surveys and an expert survey of party positions in member states of the European Union over the period 1984 to 1996 (Ray 1999), we find empirical support for each of the approaches outlined above. However, the most powerful explanation of party positions is the cleavage hypothesis. Although European integration is a new issue on the political agenda, parties strive to encapsulate it within their established ideologies. The range of likely responses of political parties to this new issue appears to be bounded by the histories and the issues and conflicts that define the parties, summarized in the political cleavages on which a party stands. To the extent electoral pressures influence party positions on European integration, we find that they are filtered through pre-existing ideologies.
Hypotheses

Cleavage theory
Cleavage theory claims that the positions of political parties reflect divisions in the social structure and the ideologies that provoke and express those group divisions (Zuckerman 1982) . From this standpoint, political parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures, but are organizations with historically rooted ideologies that guide their response to new issues. Parties do not re-invent themselves with each electoral cycle, but instead have established constituencies and long-standing agendas that give rise to "essential and indelible associations with particular issues and policies" (Klingemann et. al. 1994, 24) . We hypothesize that these historically grounded Weltanschauungen constitute "prisms" through which political parties respond to the issue of European integration. Table 1 encapsulates the historically rooted cleavages and programmatic commitments of party families and summarizes how such commitments constrain party positioning on European integration.
Political cleavages, and the party families that arise from them, reflect the ideological and constituency bases of political parties as they have developed historically. The older class, religious, and center/periphery cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) , along with the recent "new politics" cleavage, (Inglehart 1990, ch.2; Kitschelt 1994 , ch.1) summarize political parties' ideological underpinnings. Cleavages provide voters with manageable information about parties; represent reputational investments that sustain a party's credibility; describe the deeply rooted ideologies that structure electoral competition; and, most relevant for this article, filter the response of parties to new issues that arise on the agenda.
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National location
European integration is an example of an issue for which national context is likely to be crucial.
The European Union brings together countries with deeply rooted national histories, identities, and institutions. A new over-arching polity has been created, but there are reasons to believe that national contexts are as important as ever in mediating the domestic impacts of international events and processes (Héritier, Knill and Mingers 1996, ch.1; Kitschelt, Lange, Marks, and Stephens 1999, 440-1; Soskice 1999, 106ff; McKeown 1999, 22f) . Indeed, many scholars have argued that the interplay of national interests is the most important factor shaping basic institutions and policy-making in the European Union.
The national view of European integration is rooted in several literatures. Discourse theorists argue that citizens in different countries have deeply rooted national identities that shape their views of European integration and distinguish between "British," "French" or "German" conceptions of European integration (Hedetoft 1995, ch.1) . This view is also consistent with both of the major streams of international relations literature about European integration: realism and intergovernmentalism. From the realist perspective, responses to a new international issue like European integration reflect its impact on the distribution of power in the international system (Waltz 1979, ch.5) . Intergovernmentalists pose economic preferences, not relative power, as the motor of inter-state relations (Moravcsik 1998, 28ff) .
From either the realist or the intergovernmentalist standpoint, the political and economic logics of regional integration give rise to distinctly national, not party-political, variations in position.
Median supporter
A second alternative theory is that parties position themselves to maximize their share of the popular vote. Formal spatial models of multi-party competition yield the broad prediction that party positions will tend to spread across the available issue space assuming that citizens vote sincerely, not strategically, and that parties maximize votes irrespective of coalition potential. We sharpen this finding into a testable point prediction by assuming that the way in which parties spread out reflects "the central tendency of attitudes of their electorates" (Iversen 1994, 157 ).
The key assumptions, which justify our prediction that the positions taken by political parties will mirror that of their median voter, revolve around the heterogeneity of the electorate. Electoral competition may be conceived of as two-sided. On the one hand, political parties appeal to their longterm supporters, on the other hand they seek to peel off the least committed supporters of competing parties. The formal literature on the topic suggests that it is rational for a vote-maximizing party to locate its issue positions near that of its median supporter across a range of assumptions concerning the distribution of voter issue preferences and the trade off for individual citizens between issue proximity and party support (Adams 1998, 6 ).
2 Substantive hypotheses linking particular party families to position on European integration are elaborated in Marks and Wilson (2000) .
There is also the possibility, raised in the literature investigating party-citizen links, that causality here may run in both directions. That is to say, voters may follow parties, as well as parties voters (Steenbergen and Scott 1997, 3) . However, this possibility is not a problem for the analyses presented in this paper. Our formulation of the partisanship linkage hypothesis avoids assumptions about the directions of causality in the relationship of parties to their constituency. We hypothesize that the issue position of a political party will be the same as that of its median supporter.
Strategic competition
A political party may take a position on a new issue in order to manipulate the salience of that issue hoping thereby to alter the underlying dimensions of party competition. Ian Budge and David Robertson summarize the basic argument: "Parties compete by accentuating issues on which they have an undoubted advantage, rather than by putting forward contrasting policies on the same issues" (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987: 391) . According to the directional model of party competition, parties taking "moderate" positions on an issue will effectively reduce the importance of that issue in the voters' minds, while extreme positions multiply the importance of an issue (Rabinowitz and Macdonald 1989) . This suggests that mainstream parties will seek to defuse the salience of a new issue by taking median positions with respect to it, while parties that are peripheral will attempt to "shake up" the system by taking extreme positions.
This expectation accords with informal observation of party positioning on European integration.
Several writers have hypothesized that major parties support European integration, while minor parties take critical positions in an effort to shake up the party system (Hix and Lord 1997, ch.3; Taggart 1998; Scott 2001, ch.2) . Issue convergence among mainstream parties minimizes competition among them, and thereby minimizes intra-party tensions that would result from staking out distinctive positions. As for minor parties, they have little to lose in formulating an extreme position on the new issue. In this way they can "set themselves apart from the 'centre' of politics" (Taggart 1998, 384) , and, in the process, compete on a new dimension of contestation that is tangential to the established left/right dimension on which they are minor players.
There are three ways to formulate this hypothesis depending on whether one conceptualizes "mainstream" party in terms of votes, left/right position, or government participation. First, one might expect parties which win a large share of the vote to converge on more positive positions with respect to European integration and less electorally successful parties to be Euro-skeptical. Second, parties that are centrally located on the left/right dimension of party competition may seek to minimize the salience of European integration as an issue by taking positive positions, while parties that are located towards the left or right extremes may take correspondingly critical positions on European integration. Finally, parties that have been excluded from government may take extreme, and Euro-skeptical, positions on the issue.
Models and Data
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is party position on European integration at four points : 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996. 3 Our data are averages of evaluations from an expert survey conducted by Leonard Ray (1999) . Eight to ten experts for each country evaluated the position of each national party along a sevenpoint scale from "strongly opposed to European integration" to "strongly in favor of European integration." For ease of interpretation, we rescale these positions to range from 0 (strongly opposed) to 1 (strongly in favor).
The experts were instructed to evaluate the positions taken by the leadership of each political party, and these estimates refer to four years, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 . Reliability is a particular concern when experts are being asked to make retrospective judgments of party positions. An analysis of the standard deviations of the individual expert judgments suggests only a modest decrease in reliability for the early years. 4 As reported in the Appendix to this text, the reliability of these expert judgments (as 3 The data cover political parties in the member states of the EU. Parties are included for a given year only if they participated in the preceding national election. New members of the EU are included in the analysis following their accession to the EU. We exclude Luxembourg because of problems of data availability. 4 As reported in Ray (1999) , the standard deviation of the expert judgments decreases slightly each year dropping from .97 for evaluations of 1984 to .82 for evaluations of 1996. Note that these standard deviations are based on the indicated by the standard deviation as a proportion of the scale range) is comparable to the reliability of estimates produced by previous expert surveys.
The validity of our data can be established by a comparing the estimates for 1988 5 with data on party orientations towards European integration drawn from the Eurobarometer survey for the spring of 1988 and party positions derived from party platform data collected by the Comparative Party Manifesto project. Principal components factor analysis indicated that one underlying factor could account for most of the variance in these three indicators. The differences in factor loadings do suggest that some of the measures capture the underlying variable better than others. Our expert survey data appear to come closest to the underlying party positions (loading = .95), the Comparative Party Manifesto data a close second (loading = .93), and the Eurobarometer third (loading = .87). We are confident that our data provide a reliable and valid measure of party positions.
Independent Variables
We operationalize cleavage theory political cleavages by creating dichotomous variables for ten party families: extreme right, conservative, Protestant, Christian democratic, liberal, agrarian, green, regionalist, social democratic, and extreme left/communist (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967 and Klaus von Beyme 1985, ch. 2) who distinguish between liberal and agrarian parties and between parties having Protestant roots (in Northwest Europe) and those having Catholic roots.
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Our national location hypothesis refers to the country in which a party is located. Accordingly we include dichotomous variables for each of the fourteen countries of the European Union included in this analysis.
original data that were scaled 1-7. We rescale the data from zero to one in the multivariate analysis to make interpretation easier. The original Ray data includes more cases than used in this analysis since we choose to exclude parties that do not receive votes in at least one lower house election immediately prior to the years 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 . The Ray data also includes non-EU countries and Luxembourg. 5 1988 is used because of the availability of two comparison datasets for that year. 6 Until recently, Catholic Christian democratic parties could be differentiated from Protestant parties on account of the latter's exclusion from the transnational "European Christian Democratic Union." However, this organization become obsolete with EU enlargement and it merged with the EPP in 1999. Most sources on party families distinguish between these two groups of parties (Von Beyme 1985: 89; Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 18 and 38) . Marks and Wilson (2000) note that liberal and agrarian parties and Protestant and Catholic/non-denominational parties have clearly distinct cleavage bases, and they hypothesize that parties in these families have correspondingly distinct positions on European integration.
To test the media supporter hypothesis we use data on voter's drawn from the Eurobarometer. Participation is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for political parties that have participated in at least one national government over the period 1965-1995 and zero otherwise.
Discussion
7 The Eurobarometer surveys used were # 21, 22, 29, 30, 37, 38, and 44.2 bis which correspond to the years of the expert survey. Eurobarometer #29 was provided by the Zentralarchiv in Cologne, the other surveys were by the ICPSR. 8 With a six-point scale, the use of a simple median would greatly restrict the variance of this variable by discarding relevant information about the distribution of party supporters in the intervals above and below the one containing the median. 9 Parties that compete as part of electoral coalitions are excluded when it is impossible to partition the vote.
Each of our hypotheses finds some support in the evidence that we bring to bear. When our measure of party position in regressed on the full set of variables (plus controls for year), the resulting regression model explains 80 percent of the variance in party position (see Table 2 ).
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Our statistical analysis strongly confirms the hypothesis we have drawn from cleavage theory.
The party families that have arisen from the political cleavages that have shaped Western Europe from the Protestant Reformation to the present explain almost two-thirds of the variance in the issue positions of individual political parties on European integration. The coefficients for the categorical variables in this model represent the difference between the mean for that category and the mean of the omitted reference category. In our model, we omit the communist/extreme left, which is located near the negative extreme and contains more than fifteen cases (parties by year). Any party family that tends to be similarly Euroskeptic will have a small and insignificant coefficient.
The relative positions of party families are in line with the expectations set out in Table 1 . The most favorably oriented party families are the liberal and the Christian democratic, followed by the social democratic and regionalist. Next come the agrarian, the conservative and the green party families. The Protestant, extreme right, and communist/extreme left families are the most Euro-skeptical. Party families vary systematically in their support for European integration and that this variation is intelligible in terms of their cleavage location.
While the most dramatic differences in mean position involve small and/or extreme parties, the differences among the large moderate party families are important. The contrast in support between extreme party families and the rest does not drive our results. When we exclude communist/extreme left, 8 Given the structure of our data, we do not discount the possibility there are dynamic processes occurring over time and/or violations of error assumptions in regression analysis when we time-pool our data. We assign dummy variables for country and time to minimize errors of inference given that panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) analysis and generalized least squares error components (GLSE) analysis are inappropriate for our data. We have run the same analyses on a subset of the data for which we have positions for all four years. While there is some change over time, we find the same relationships between the variables in each year. By pooling the data, we can extreme right, and green parties from our analysis, we find that party family still explains 45 percent of the remaining variance.
ANOVA (analysis of variance) models allow us to measure the extent to which variation on our continuous dependent variable, party position, is explained by continuous variables and sets of categorical variables. The ω 2 (omega-squared) for party family is consistently high in relation to those for all other variables in our analysis, and is the strongest influence in the full model (see Table 2 ). When we drop left/right extremism from the analysis, the influence of party family is especially large, at least twice as high as the next most powerful influence, median supporter. The reason for this is that left/right extremism taps the Euro-skepticism of the extreme left and right in relation to all other party families, and so competes directly with party family. However, left/right extremism captures only one dimension underlying differences among party families. Cleavages based on religion, center/periphery, and new politics also shape party families, and these exert an independent effect on party positioning.
The model in Table 2 includes categorical variables for individual countries, with
Denmark as the excluded reference category. The coefficients for other countries which are similarly Euro-skeptic are insignificant, while those for countries that contrast most sharply with our reference category-i.e. Belgium, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UKare large and significant. Several country variables are highly significant, though the combined explanatory power of the country dummies is only five percent of the total explained variance (given by the ω 2 ). National location and political cleavages do not appear to be contending sources of party positioning on European integration. It is also possible that political cleavages and territorial location are interactive rather than competing influences on party (Hix 1999, 73f The hypothesis that a political party will approximate the issue positions of its median supporter is strongly confirmed in our analysis. The correlation between this variable and party position on European integration is 0.62. In the multivariate analysis, this variable remains highly significant and substantively strong. A one-unit change in the issue position of the median voter is associated with a change of .78 on a similarly configured scale measuring party position.
The performance of this variable is impressive, particularly in relation to other variables that attempt to capture the electoral dynamics of party positioning. While the correlation between left/right extremism and party position is similar to that of median supporter, median supporter becomes much more influential when both are present in the same model. The chief weakness of the median supporter measure is that the variable does not distinguish efficiently among parties in the four major families. In particular, it mispredicts the relatively Euro-skeptical positions of conservative parties. These parties are rooted in the defense of national culture and community against the influx of immigrants, against competing sources of identity within the state, and in defense of national sovereignty (see Table 1 ). The relative Euro-skepticism of conservative parties is not reflected in the positions of their median supporters.
We cannot determine the extent to which the association between median voter and party position on European integration results from voters following parties or parties following voters. But the association is strong. This is all the more surprising because few parties have been punished because they were out-of-line with their supporters on the issue of European integration. European integration is rarely decisive in national or EU elections (Franklin and Van der Eijk 1996, ch.1).
One plausible explanation for the strength of the association between median supporter and party position is that party supporters and activists share ideologies that give rise to particular positions on a range of issues, including those that are not electorally decisive. Party family is designed specifically to capture the role of ideology in framing party positions, and when median voter and party family are The left/right extremism hypothesis is highly efficient: it generates predictions on the basis of minimal information. This is because it correctly predicts the EU positions of a relatively small number of parties at either end of the left/right spectrum in relation to the much larger number parties in between.
This is an important finding, but it is not the last word. Cleavage theory can explain a greater proportion of variance in party position, and unlike that explained by left/right extremism, it is not tapped by other variables set out here. The chief virtue of the left/right extremism hypothesis is its parsimony. The chief virtue of the party family hypothesis is its accuracy.
Conclusion
Each of the hypotheses evaluated in this article provides insight into the positioning of political parties on new issues that arise on the political agenda. The location of a party on the left/right dimension is closely associated with its position on European integration. Even stronger is the connection between the position of a party and that of its median supporter. Stronger yet is the effect of party family.
These findings are consistent with a cleavage theory of party positioning in which basic social divisions give rise to ideological commitments that condition the response of political parties to new issues. European integration is a substantively important case for investigating this line of theorizing, but we should caution that it is a single case. Future research will have to evaluate whether and how variation among new issues affects the relative weight of the factors we have investigated. A logical extension of our theory is that the less transparent the electoral consequences of party positioning on a new issue, the greater the influence of cleavage location.
When Ernst Haas set out a neofunctional theory of European integration in the late 1950s he scrutinized party orientations in great detail because he was convinced that the fate of European integration was in the hands of domestic actors, party leaders chief among them, who would press their governments to integrate further or hold back (Haas 1958, ch.4 
